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Information Content of Directors’ Trading Around Acquisitions 
 
1. Introduction 
Information asymmetries exist between company insiders and outside investors. 
Because of preferential access to information, directors are subject to increased scrutiny, 
regulation, and restrictions regarding their trading activities (Cohen et al., 2012). Despite 
such strict regulations on directors’ trading, several empirical studies have provided evidence 
that, on average, directors outperform other investors when trading their own stocks and the 
market perceives these trades are informative. Prior research also shows that there is a 
significant increase in insider trading in the acquiring firms prior to corporate acquisitions or 
merger announcements (Boehmer and Netter, 1997; Luo,  2005; Seyhun, 1990). As the 
acquisition can change the risk-return profile of the acquiring firm, directors may be more 
inclined to act opportunistically to time the market by investing more (less) of their personal 
resources in their firms prior to such announcements (Boehmer and Netter, 1997). More 
importantly, acquiring firms’ directors have higher incentive to trade prior to corporate 
acquisitions due to the fact that directors of acquiring firms have relatively longer-term 
interest in their firms as compared to directors of targets. Therefore, it is important to 
examine the directors’ trading in acquiring firms prior to corporate acquisitions.  
In our paper, we attempt to critically address the specific issue of the information 
content of the directors’ trade in conjecture with the motive of directors’ trade on various 
acquisition characteristics. Specifically, we address the issues of (i) how acquirer directors’ 
trading prior to acquisition of private targets differs from acquirer directors’ trading of public 
targets; (ii) whether acquirer directors’ trading conveys valuable information for stock-
financed acquisitions; and (iii) how bidders’ governance mechanisms affect the information 
content of acquirer directors’ trading prior to acquisition announcements.  
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A considerable information asymmetry or uncertainty is likely to exist about the value 
of the private target’s assets and opportunities compared to public targets (Officer et al., 
2009; Madura and Susnjara, 2013). Private firms have few analysts following them and scant 
disclosure requirements, which makes it difficult for investors to acquire information about a 
private target. As information asymmetry is more prevalent in acquisitions of privately held 
firms, we expect that information content of directors’ trading is more valuable to market 
participants when bidders acquire private targets. On the other hand, acquirer directors have 
the added advantage of knowing the private targets better as they are part of the discussions 
leading to acquisition decisions, which may induce them to trade heavily and 
opportunistically to time their trade to reap personal gain. Therefore, we investigate the effect 
of directors’ trading on announcement period abnormal returns, distinguishing the bidders for 
public targets and bidders for private targets. 
It is plausible that opportunistic directors might be especially sensitive to the probable 
whistle blowing and potential cost attached to such trading when better governance is in place 
(Cohen et al. 2012; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Recent empirical studies suggest that strong 
corporate governance curtails insider-trading profits (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). We, 
therefore, examine the moderating effects of the corporate governance characteristics of the 
bidding firms while examining the information content of directors’ trading.  
We investigate acquiring firm directors’ trading prior to acquisition announcements 
which occurred between 2004 and 2012 for the Australian market. We start our analysis by 
examining whether directors’ trades prior to acquisition announcements have any significant 
impact on announcement period abnormal returns. Our initial analysis shows that the 
announcement period abnormal return is higher for those acquiring firms where directors do 
trade comparing to bidding firms where directors do not trade one month, two months and 
three months prior to the acquisition announcement. This finding supports the conjecture that 
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directors exploit their natural information advantage and their trades have significant 
information content for outsiders, especially when outsiders evaluate these trades in 
conjunction with acquisition announcements. The subsequent analysis shows that the level of 
directors’ trading is more prevalent for private target acquisitions compared to public target 
acquisitions. Our results suggest that directors’ trades convey more valuable information 
when bidders acquire small private targets compared to large public targets. As private firms 
have a high level of information asymmetry and are difficult to evaluate, the directors’ trade 
prior to private target acquisitions reveals higher informational value compared to public 
targets. While examining the role of method of payment for acquisitions in directors’ trading, 
our analysis of stock-only payment method shows that directors’ trades have differential 
influence on stock-financed public targets versus stock-financed private targets. This finding 
supports the view that informational value of directors’ trading is more pronounced for stock-
financed private targets due to difficulty in valuing such targets. This finding is consistent 
with the view that stock-acquisition mitigates information asymmetry about the target 
(Hansen, 1987). On the other hand, directors’ trading in stock-financed public targets indicate 
that their equity is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
We find that the information content of directors’ trading on acquisition 
announcement period returns is weaker in firms with higher blockholdings and/or firms with 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board. This implies that directors’ trading 
contains less informational value when there are higher blockholders who monitor the firms, 
as well as when there is a higher proportion of independent directors on the board (Adams et 
al., 2008). Our results confirm that the market takes into account the firm’s governance 
structure when reacting to acquisition announcements preceded by directors’ trading. In 
better-governed companies directors are less likely to extract rent.   
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Our paper contributes to the current literature in the following ways. First, we show 
that directors’ trading is positively related to acquirers’ announcement period abnormal 
returns. This finding can be explained by the directors’ opportunistic motive prior to 
acquisitions to reap private benefits which in turn convey information signals to the market 
participants about the target firms’ value-relevant information. Our paper systematically 
reveals the rent-seeking behavior of acquiring firms’ directors and informational value of 
such trades in relation to various acquisition characteristics. Second, we extend the prior 
literature by directly investigating the effect of pre-announcement period directors’ trading on 
the announcement period abnormal returns after controlling various acquisition 
characteristics (Seyhun, 1990; Cumming and Li, 2011).
1
 Our investigation is not only 
confined to directors’ ‘buy’ trades, we have also examined directors’ ‘sell’ trades, similar in 
spirit to Song (2007). Third, we find that pre-announcement period directors’ trading is more 
valuable to market participants when private targets are acquired due to opacity and illiquid 
nature of private targets (Officer et al. 2009). We further document that directors significantly 
increase the dollar value of buy trades prior to private target acquisitions, implying that 
directors have superior private information. Finally, our paper takes into consideration the 
governance profile of the bidding firms while examining directors’ trading prior to 
acquisitions. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Betzer and Theissen (2009) show that the ownership 
structure of firms has a significant impact on the informational value of directors’ trading. 
Similarly, Fidrmuc et al. (2013) highlight that better shareholder protection might curb 
insider trading and result in smaller stock returns to insiders. We extend these studies by 
showing that opportunistic trading by directors prior to corporate announcements such as 
mergers and acquisitions can be mitigated by strong internal monitoring and the presence of 
                                                          
1
 Seyhun (1990) examines the trading patterns of top corporate managers in bidder firms around the 
announcement of corporate takeovers. Cumming and Li (2011) show the relationship between the pre-
announcement trading of acquirer stock and insider trading. 
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external stakeholders. Overall, we add to the literature by empirically divulging the motive 
and informativeness of directors’ trading prior to corporate acquisitions.2 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the main 
hypotheses to investigate. Section 3 presents sample and data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the 
research methodology and results, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Directors are a unique class of traders as, by definition, they have favored access to 
private information about their own companies. A number of studies confirm this by 
providing the evidence that insiders’ buy trades convey positive information about the firm’s 
prospects and the stock market reacts positively and significantly using both long-event 
windows (see Gregory et al., 1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Seyhun, 1986) and short-
event windows (for example, Betzer and Theissen, 2009; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Prior 
literature provides mixed evidence on the information content of insider sell trades (see 
Tavakoli et al., 2012; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). There will be times when these directors 
need to sell the shares of their own companies for reasons other than private information. 
However, the information content of an insider sell is less clear as it may represent either 
unfavorable information about the firm’s prospects (Tavakoli et al., 2012) or it could be due 
to liquidity reasons or consumption reasons.  
Directors’ trading prior to firm announcements is more informative in nature and 
provides valuable information to the market. Therefore, it is obvious that directors’ trades 
convey more valuable information to market participants in the context of major corporate 
events. John and Mishra (1990) provide a theoretical model where insiders use their own net 
trading to communicate their private information to the market during the announcement of 
                                                          
2
 See Balachandran et al. (2016) for the future direction of M&A research. 
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changes in capital expenditure. They argue that market reaction to changes in capital 
expenditure is dependent on concurrent insider trading. Seyhun (1990) reports that the 
managers of bidding firms increase their net purchase prior to acquisition announcement and 
purchase more shares if the firm makes a good acquisition. Draper and Paudyal (2008) argue 
that mergers and acquisitions announcements are credible methods to enhance the 
transparency of a firm by disseminating information to the market to attract the attention of 
investors and analysts. When directors increase their purchases as well as net purchases (the 
difference between the value of shares bought and sold) prior to such mergers and 
acquisitions announcements, it is expected to reduce the degree of information asymmetry 
about the future prospects of the firm and as a result expected to achieve larger absolute 
changes in bidders’ valuation.  
We also posit that managers have incentives to trade opportunistically in their 
personal trades prior to corporate mergers and acquisitions announcements. In general, when 
managers are optimistic (pessimistic) about the future prospects and riskiness of the firm 
following corporate mergers and acquisitions, they have high incentive to time the market by 
increasing (decreasing) their personal holdings to take advantage of the insider information 
they possess about the value of their firm. The above signaling prediction of directors’ 
trading along with the rent-seeking motive of directors’ trade prior to corporate acquisitions 
lead to the following conjecture: 
Hypothesis 1: Acquirer directors’ net dollar value of trade prior to acquisition 
announcement is positively related to the announcement period abnormal returns of bidding 
firms.  
The nexus between directors’ trading prior to corporate acquisitions and 
announcement period abnormal returns is an important and puzzling phenomenon in the 
rising M&A landscape. In particular, the issue gets more complicated when incorporating the 
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effect of various types of directors’ trade on different acquisition characteristics. In an 
attempt to address the issue, we also distinguish between public and private targets 
acquisition in our analysis. The number of bidders for public targets is generally significantly 
larger than bidders for private targets. Freeman (1987) suggests that information on large 
firms is more readily available than for small firms. Therefore, we expect that there is a high 
disparity on the degree of information asymmetry between bidders of public targets versus 
bidders of private targets. Consequently, directors’ trading prior to private target bids is 
expected to convey better value to market participants than public target bids due to the level 
of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. As private firms are 
more opaque than publicly traded companies, the valuation of privately held targets is very 
difficult (Officer et al., 2009). Therefore, market participants are at least partially or less 
likely informed about the nature of the target’s business and its financial make-up at the 
acquisition announcement for private targets. In this context, directors have superior 
information about the future prospects of private targets; thus directors’ trading activity sends 
direct signals to the market participants to communicate their private information. Therefore, 
we expect that acquirer directors’ dollar value of trade prior to private target’s acquisition 
announcements should elicit more stock market response compared to acquisition of public 
targets. We anticipate a significant positive relation between acquirer directors’ net dollar 
value of trades and announcement period abnormal returns of bidding firms in acquisitions of 
private targets. It implies that directors’ net dollar value of trades prior to acquisition 
announcement of private targets conveys more valuable information about the value of the 
target’s assets and opportunities.  
A number of mergers and acquisitions studies conducted across many markets 
invariably conclude that acquisitions of public targets are value-destroying decisions which 
are intended to satisfy managers’ private benefits at shareholders’ expense. A manager’s 
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decision to acquire a large and well-known public target can be associated with increasing 
firm size and gaining prestige rather than value-creation motive. On the other hand, 
acquisitions of private targets are associated with significantly higher abnormal returns than 
public target acquisition announcements (see Ang and Kohers, 2001; Chang, 1998; da Silva 
Rosa et al., 2004; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2002; Shams et 
al., 2013). In light of the above findings, we expect that opportunistic directors have high 
incentive to increase their buy trades prior to acquisitions of private targets and increase 
(decrease) their sell (buy) trade prior to acquisitions of public targets. Therefore, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer directors’ net dollar value of trades prior to acquisition of 
private targets (public targets) is positively (negatively) related to the announcement period 
abnormal returns of bidding firms. 
 
There are two pronounced theories explaining the rationale of payment method choice 
in corporate acquisitions. The choice of payment methods is mostly determined by the level 
of information asymmetry (see Fishman, 1989) and overvaluation of bidders’ stock (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Myers and Majluf’s model proposes that the managers will prefer a cash 
offer if they believe that their equities are undervalued, while stock payment will be offered 
in the opposite case. Jensen (2005) suggests that overvalued equity increases managerial 
discretion and even coerces managers into making value-destroying investments, particularly 
stock-financed acquisitions. Consistently, prior studies suggest that stock-financed public 
firms’ acquisitions are associated with negative shareholder wealth effects, while cash-
financed deals are associated with normal or even small positive announcement effects at the 
announcement (e.g. Travlos, 1987; Brown and Ryngaert, 1991). In this case, rational 
investors anticipate stock-financed acquisitions as a signal of firm overvaluation and hence 
driving the stock price of such acquirers down (Golubov et al., 2015). In this context, 
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managers who trade opportunistically are expected to increase their sale trade prior to stock-
financed public target acquisitions. On the other hand, stock-financed private target 
acquisitions tend to create outside blockholders when closely held private target companies 
are purchased with stock and thus are expected to increase managerial monitoring, which 
induces opportunistic managers to increase their buy trade prior to stock-financed private 
targets. Therefore, the predication of a signaling model (see Bagnoli and Khanna, 1992) 
suggests directors’ trades prior to stock-financed public target acquisitions are considered as 
bad news while the stock-financed private acquisitions convey positive information to the 
market participants about the true value of the bidding firm.  
Yook et al. (1999) report significantly larger insider selling by the management of 
bidding firms before stock offers relative to cash offers, indicating managerial rent-seeking 
behavior. In addition, the authors find significantly negative relation between insider selling 
by the management of bidding firms before the announcement and abnormal returns around 
the offer. This suggests that opportunistic bidding firms’ directors who acquire public targets 
heavily sell shares before announcements of stock offers due to the anticipation of lower 
share price during the acquisition period. On the other hand, if directors of bidding firms 
indulge in buy trades prior to stock acquisitions, such trades are expected to mitigate the 
information asymmetry regarding acquisition value and the market should perceive such 
acquisitions as value-creating decisions, irrespective of stock-financed public or private 
acquisitions. Based on the prediction of information asymmetry hypothesis
3
, and following 
Yook et al. (1999), we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirer directors’ net dollar value of trade prior to stock-financed 
public (private) target acquisition is negatively (positively) related to the announcement 
period abnormal returns of bidding firm. 
                                                          
3
 Information hypothesis predicts that managers have monopolistic access to firm-specific information which 
creates an information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
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The ownership structure of the firm is expected to influence the informational value 
of the directors’ trade (see Betzer and Theissen, 2009;  Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Betzer and 
Theissen (2009) find significant price reactions of insider trading in widely held firms. 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) show that the presence of larger blockholdings, who are likely to 
monitor the management, convey less new information to the market, which has effects on 
the market reactions of directors’ trade. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that insiders earn 
higher trading profits at firms with the ‘weakest’ governance. Cohen et al. (2012) report that 
informative insider trading is more likely to take place where monitoring and institutional 
controls are weaker. Fidrmuc et al. (2013) discuss monitoring hypothesis, which highlights 
that better shareholder protection might curb insider trading and result in smaller returns for 
insiders. In such a situation, it will not be easy for directors to extract rent from their trading 
practices, even when they trade one to three months prior to announcement of acquisition. 
We contribute to this debate by examining the governance quality of bidding firms and its 
influence on acquirer directors’ abnormal return on trading prior to acquisition announcement 
and propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Acquirer directors’ trading prior to acquisition announcement is 
positively (negatively) related to announcement period abnormal returns of the bidding firms 
when they operate in a weak (strong) governance system. 
 
 3. Sample and Data 
We analyze acquisition announcements made by Australian listed companies from 
January 2004 to December 2012. To be included in our sample, an acquisition announcement 
should only be an acquisition of public company, private company and subsidiary of an 
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Australian listed company.
4
 We exclude leveraged buyouts, self-tender offers, spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stock purchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest, and privatizations (see, Erel et al., 2012). We collect acquisition 
announcements, bid characteristics such as deal value and method of payment from Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC database hereafter). The 
final sample consists of 2,512 announcements. Further, we collect daily share price data and 
the daily values of the ASX All Ordinaries Index from DataStream. The percentage of 
independent directors on a board and the blockholdings information is gathered from 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) corporate governance database. 
We match the above M&A announcements with the directors’ trading database. Our 
main source of directors’ trading is SIRCA Insider Filling Data retrieved from Appendix 3Y. 
ASX Listing Rule 3.19 A.2 stipulates that the notifiable interest of a director of the entity 
must complete Appendix 3Y within five business days after the change occurs. We investigate 
only ‘on market transactions’5 and transactions involving 100 or more shares (see Agrawal 
and Nasser, 2012). This process leaves us with 34,442 directors’ change in interest during the 
period 2004 to 2012. These 34,442 directors’ trades are matched with the 2,512 M&A 
announcement dataset. We only examine those M&A announcements where directors change 
their interest during the three-month period prior to the announcement date. We investigate 
directors’ trading during the three-month period before takeover announcements because 
takeover process initiates, on an average, three to four months prior to first public 
announcement of a takeover (Brown and Raymond, 1986). This provides us 1,092 directors 
who trade during the pre-announcement period.  
We also exclude 645 M&A announcements due to unavailability of share price and 
other accounting data necessary for the analysis. This process results in total 413 acquisition 
                                                          
4
 Following Colombage et al.  (2013), we merge subsidiary acquisitions to the ‘public’ and ‘private’ group based 
on their parent firms’ public status. 
5
 Seyhun (1992) finds that open market transactions are more informative than private transactions. 
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announcements. We classify an announcement as ‘net buyers’ (‘net sellers’) announcements 
if the total number of shares bought (sold) by directors exceeds the total number of shares 
sold (bought). This classification identifies 299 ‘net buyers’ and 114 ‘net sellers’. We also 
classify announcements into ‘aggregate buy’ and ‘aggregate sell’. Specifically, if directors 
have bought (sold) shares in the three months period prior to an announcement, we classify 
that announcement as “aggregate buy’ (‘aggregate sell’). We come up with 320 ‘aggregate 
buy’ and 127 ‘aggregate sell’.6 
Table 1 presents the distributions of the M&A announcements by the year of 
acquisitions in Panel A and by top nine industries in Panel B. Panel A shows that the 
announcements gradually increase each year up to 2007 and then gradually decrease. The 
highest average deal value is observed in year 2006 and the average (median) deal value of 
the full sample is $102.21 million ($95.55 million). The mean (median) market value of 
equity for the full sample is $1262.29 million ($1286.84 million). The percentage of shares 
acquired of the target firm is above 90 percent for every year except 2011.  
 Panel B of Table 1 shows that the sample is highly concentrated in the top nine 
industries. The largest number of takeovers is observed in mining and support service 
industry; however, financial services industry stands out for largest deal value ($611.23 
million). In our full sample, 24.16 percent of the acquisitions are mining firms, and this 
proportion is higher in the public targets sample (62.96%) compared with the private targets 
sample (37.04%).
7
 Other main industry drivers of targets are ‘Support Services’ (15.21%), 
‘Industrial Metals and Mining’ (6.49%) and ‘Financial Services’ (4.70%). Based on these 
                                                          
6
 Note that if directors have been buying and selling shares prior to an announcement, that announcement will be 
classified as both “aggregate buy’ and ‘aggregate sell’. Thus, the total number of ‘announcements’ for aggregate 
measures exceed the total number of ‘announcements’ for the net measures. We use the net measure in our 
regression analysis.  
7
  Details are available upon request. 
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findings, we control for industry effects in our analysis of directors’ trading and market 
reaction to M&A announcements.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 displays the summary statistics of directors’ trading for the whole 
sample, which documents the pattern up to three months prior to acquisition announcements. 
This table divides the descriptive statistics for the sample into two categories: (i) aggregate 
measures of directors’ trading, (ii) net measures of directors’ trading. In Panel A, under 
aggregate measures, the average sell value ($1.99 ml) is much higher than the average buy 
value ($0.42 ml). This pattern of trading is more or less similar in net measures of directors’ 
trading. The average net sell value ($2.10 ml) is more than four times larger than the average 
net buy value ($0.45 ml). The average quantity of shares sold (2.37 ml) is also higher than the 
average quantity of net shares bought (0.66 ml).  
In panel B of Table 2, directors’ trading patterns are reported for each of the three 
months prior to acquisition announcement date. Both the average quantity and the average 
dollar value of net buy trade during the one month (month -1) period prior to acquisition 
announcement is relatively larger than the average quantity and the average value of the 
shares traded in (month -2) and (month -3) periods, particularly in private targets, indicating 
directors’ do trade opportunistically, which seems to be based on private information. The 
panel also shows that the directors’ net buy of shares is increasing from (month -3) (0.28 ml) 
to (month -1) (0.75 ml) when they acquire a private target; however, this pattern is not 
consistent when acquiring a public target, though the same cannot be said about net sell 
category. The average dollar value of net sell is much larger for public target’s bids than 
private target’s bids in one month prior to corporate acquisitions.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
15 
 
Table 3 provides information for directors’ trading and deal characteristics for full 
sample, public targets and private targets. In Panel A, the average quantity and the average 
dollar value of the directors’ trades for full sample is 1.09 million and 1.20 million, 
respectively. Both average quantity and average dollar value of directors’ trade is slightly 
larger for public target sample (1.12 ml/quantity and $1.38 ml/value) compared to private 
target sample (1.07 ml/quantity and $1.09ml/value). The average dollar value of net buy 
trades is $0.52 million compared to 2.98 million sell trade for full sample. The untabulated 
additional analysis of mean test differences between dollar value of directors’ net sell trade 
and net buy trade of full sample is found statistically significant at 1 percent level. This result 
shows that directors are more likely to buy shares (126.68 ml) when acquiring a private target 
compared to acquiring a public target (28.80 ml), indicating that directors’ trading is more 
pronounced for private targets, which are expected to have high level of information 
asymmetry. This trading pattern is reversed in the case of sell trades. This indicates that 
directors of public target acquirers are more likely to sell shares up to three months prior to 
the acquisition announcement than directors of private target acquirers, implying that 
directors may trade opportunistically to time the market during mergers and acquisitions 
announcements. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the average deal value of the public targets ($263.96 
ml) is nearly 15 times larger than the average deal value of private targets ($18.78 ml). 
Similarly, the average market value of bids for public target ($2931.07 ml), is three times 
more than the bids for private targets ($929.89 ml). The return analysis indicates that those 
acquisition announcements in which directors have traded prior to announcements generate 
more return as compared to the ones in which directors have not traded one to three months 
prior to acquisition. 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
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4. Methodology 
To address the main research question of this study, first, the conventional event study 
methodology is employed and abnormal returns are calculated for a three-day announcement 
period (from day t-1 to day t+1), where day t is the announcement day. This three-day event 
window during announcement period is similar to the prior M&A studies (Dong et al., 2006; 
Fuller et al., 2002). Following Luo (2005), the market model parameters are estimated using 
returns for -250 to -50 days before the M&A announcements.  
                              ,         [1] 
Where Ri,t is the return of the stock i on day t, Rm,t is the return on the market index on day t 
(ASX All Ordinaries Index), and      is the error term. The expected returns generated by the 
above market model is then deducted from the event period actual daily returns to calculate 
abnormal returns. 
                    
    
     ,          [2] 
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i from day t-1 to day t+1. We 
compute t-statistics for CAR after adjusting for cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns, 
as in Brown and Warner (1985).  
We estimate the following regression model to investigate the key question whether 
those takeover announcements in which directors indulged in trading (one to three months) 
before takeover announcements provide valuable information in terms of abnormal return to 
potential shareholders or not: 
                               
 
         ,      [3] 
where IT_dummy is a dummy variable (which takes the value of 1 when directors trade prior 
to acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise), used to capture the effect of directors’ 
trades, and X represents various bid- and firm-specific variables that may affect bidders’ 
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abnormal returns. The bid-specific characteristics are: (i) Dummy stock-only (which takes the 
value of 1 if the acquisition is a fully stock-financed acquisition, and zero otherwise), (ii) 
Dummy Public Target (which takes the value of 1 if the acquisition is for public target, and 
zero otherwise) and (iii) Relative Size of the deal (derived by dividing the deal value by the 
bidder’s market value); and three firm-specific variables are (i) Ln Market Value (the natural 
logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity in the acquisition announcement year as the 
size measure); (ii) NITA (the return on assets as the profitability measure calculated by 
dividing the net income by total assets of the announcement year), and (iii) CFTA (the free 
cash flow-to-assets ratio as a measure of cash richness, calculated by dividing net cash 
receipts from operations by total assets of announcement year). We estimate equation [3] for 
all the firms which make acquisition announcement during the sample period. 
We further investigate the information content of the “net levels” of directors’ trading 
for the M&A announcements with pre-announcement directors’ trading. We then estimate 
equation [4] for the full sample, public targets and private targets. We estimate the following 
regression 
                   
 
           
 
         ,               [4] 
where the dependent variable is the three-day announcement period abnormal returns to 
bidders, the vector of IT variables contains the explanatory variables used to capture the 
effect of directors’ trades and, X represents various bid- and firm-specific variables that may 
affect bidders’ abnormal returns. We use the following two measures of directors’ trades: (i) 
the net dollar value of trade scaled by market value of equity in the announcement year 
(NVMV); (ii) Dummy Net Buyer variable (which takes the value of 1 if the acquisition is 
preceded by directors’ change in interest when buy transaction exceeds sell transaction from 
the open market, and zero otherwise). Other control variables are similar to those defined in 
Equation [3].  
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 We use the total dollar value of the shares bought minus the total dollar value of the 
shares sold over the period of -3 months to -1 month as the measure of pre-announcement 
director trading, similar to Louis (2013). We also estimate equations [3] and [4] by adding 
industry and year dummies to control the industry and year effects to estimate the relationship 
between directors’ trading patterns and announcement period abnormal returns. We estimate 
equation [4] for ‘full sample’, ‘public targets sample’, ‘private targets sample’ and ‘stock 
only payment method sample’. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom five percentiles. 
 
 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Univariate analysis of bidders’ abnormal returns based on pre-announcement period 
directors’ trading 
We examine whether announcement period abnormal returns differ when directors 
trade in their own stocks up to three months prior to acquisition announcement. We start our 
analysis with estimating announcement period abnormal returns for bidders for full samples 
and subsamples (public targets and private targets) by employing conventional event study 
method for three-day event window period. Each of the subsamples is further classified into 
buy and sell trade groups. The results are presented in Table 4.
8,9
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                          
8
 We have calculated market-adjusted returns for the three-day event window as an alternative measure of 
abnormal return. The two samples generate the following abnormal returns for full sample which are significant 
at the 1 percent level: net buyers 4.68 percent and net sellers 2.56 percent, which are statistically different at 5 
percent level. 
9
 We have also analyzed the five-day event window. The results are qualitatively similar but the magnitude of 
the return is larger. 
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Panel A of Table 4 shows that bidding firms realize significant positive abnormal 
returns over the three-day event window regardless of the trading pattern (buy or sell of 
shares by directors) prior to acquisition announcement, with exception of net sell measure of 
private targets. Results suggest that when directors buy shares, market responds more 
positively (4.55%) for such announcements than when directors sell shares (2.06%) in net 
measure. The results are qualitatively similar in both aggregate and net measures of directors’ 
trading. These results provide preliminary evidence that directors’ trading has an explanatory 
power as far as return on acquisition announcement is concerned. The magnitude of abnormal 
stock return is relatively higher for private targets (4.63%) compared to public targets 
(4.40%) when directors are ‘net buyers’; however, the mean differences are statistically 
insignificant between these two groups.
10
 Our results corroborate prior studies which 
investigate insider trading prior to acquisition announcement (Song, 2007; Cumming and Li, 
2011). The analysis of two subsamples reveals that bidders for public targets earn statistically 
insignificant returns when directors are ‘net sellers’ prior to acquisition announcement date. 
Directors’ ‘net selling’ prior to corporate acquisitions indicates opportunistic trading by 
directors, which signals the probable forthcoming announcement of non-value enhancing 
acquisitions. This finding is consistent with prior studies that opportunistic managers are 
intended to sell their own personal holdings in the firm prior to bad acquisitions; 
consequently increase in insider sales and decrease in insider purchase (Kahle, 2000; Song, 
2007). We also find evidence that the market reaction is positive and significant irrespective 
of directors’ buy and sell trades when bidders acquire a private target.  
The takeover literature consistently indicates that acquisitions of private targets 
generate statistically significant higher positive abnormal returns compared to acquisition of 
public targets (see Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Shams et al., 2013). However, our 
                                                          
10
 This result establishes the informativeness of directors’ trades as the bidders for public targets also earn 
significant positive abnormal returns following directors’ trade.  
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analysis fails to confirm, in a broad sense, that market reactions are statistically different 
between public and private targets, which may be due to the fact that market reaction in our 
sample is conditional to directors’ trading. Overall, the above finding suggests that directors 
trade opportunistically prior to acquisitions and these trades are informative in nature, which 
signals to the market participants about the value-relevance information of acquisitions. Our 
result is consistent with the prior Australian studies that examine insider trading and market 
reactions (Uylangco et al., 2010). Since the main finding of Table 4 is qualitatively similar 
for both aggregate and net position measures of directors’ trading we, therefore, report the net 
measures of directors’ trading in our subsequent results. 
Panel B reports the announcement period abnormal returns for four payment methods 
conditional to pre-acquisition period directors’ trading. The magnitude of abnormal returns 
for all payment methods, except for ‘others’ group, is higher for net buy than net sell of 
directors’ shares. These findings confirm our earlier findings reported in Panel A of Table 4. 
However, the mean differences clearly indicate that the market reacts more positively on 
stock and mix financed acquisitions than the cash-financed acquisitions regardless of whether 
directors engage in ‘net buy’ or ‘net sell’ trading. 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis of bidders’ abnormal returns based on pre-announcement period 
directors’ trading 
In order to fully capture the payment methods and the effect of target ownership 
status, we investigate the announcement period abnormal returns in a multiple regression 
framework. In this framework, the effects of directors’ trades, a number of bids and financial 
characteristics of bidders are controlled for. A step-by-step regression is estimated to capture 
the information content of directors’ trading after controlling the fixed effects of industries 
and years. We also apply White’s (1980) correction procedure for heteroscedastic standard 
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errors. The untabulated Spearman rank-order correlations matrix reveals that there is no 
significant issue from multicollinearity among the independent variables in the model. 
 
5.2.1. The effect of pre-announcement period directors’ trading on abnormal M&A 
announcement period returns 
We first estimate Equation [3] to investigate whether markets react differently when 
directors trade prior to acquisition announcement versus when directors do not make any 
trade prior to acquisition announcement. We estimate four models in Table 5 to test the 
significance of directors’ trade dummy variable in the regression estimate. We find that the 
directors’ trade variable is positive and significant in all the respective models, even after 
controlling various bid and firm characteristics. This result provides strong support that 
directors’ trade prior to acquisition announcements conveys significant informational values 
to shareholders compared to those acquisitions where directors do not trade prior to 
acquisition announcements. Our results are quite similar in spirit to the findings of Seyhun 
(1990) and Cumming and Li (2011). This analysis provides initial support to the information-
content hypothesis of directors’ trade and, therefore, we investigate the research question that 
directors’ trades contain superior information to outsiders in the event of acquisition 
announcements.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In Table 6, we examine the effect of the net level of pre-announcement directors’ 
trading on announcement-period abnormal returns using M&A sample with insider trading. 
We restrict the sample to 413 announcements, of which 299 (144) announcements are where 
directors are net buyer (net seller) prior to the announcements. In model 1 of Table 6, we 
regress the dollar value of directors’ trading against the three-day abnormal returns. In model 
2 of Table 6, we report the regression estimates where we have added dummy variable for net 
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buyer and control a number of deal characteristics which influence the abnormal returns. In 
model 3 of Table 6, we incorporate a range of control variables: (i) directors’ trade measures, 
(ii) deal characteristics, and (iii) firm characteristics. Finally, in model 4, we also control the 
fixed effects of industries and years including all other control variables investigated in 
model 4. However, for expositional simplicity, we only report the main control variables. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
We find in model 1 of Table 6, that there is a significant positive relationship between 
bidders’ three-day event window abnormal returns and dollar value of directors’ trade three 
months prior to acquisition announcement.
 
The net dollar value of trade (million) scaled by 
market value of equity (million) variable (NVMV) in the regression model is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level, which strongly suggests that the pre-acquisition 
period directors’ net trading has strong association with the abnormal returns during the 
M&A announcement period. To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the 
regression controlling both deal and firm characteristics in subsequent analysis. The results 
show that both dollar value of net trades and the dummy variable for net buy remain positive 
and significant, which strongly suggests that when directors increase their net purchase, while 
committing more of their own money to their firms, outside shareholders should treat such 
trading by directors as a signal in the same direction as directors’ trade. 
In respect to directors’ other trade variables and deal-specific variables added to the 
equation, we find that the Dummy Net Buyer variable generates statistically significant 
positive coefficient, confirming the finding of the univariate results reported in Table 4. The 
other deal characteristics such as Dummy Stock Only variable and Relative Size variable 
appear to produce significant coefficients in line with previous M&A literature. Our 
regression estimates are also consistent with the view that bidders for public targets observe 
negative returns, though insignificant compared to private target acquisitions during the 
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acquisition announcement period. The results of the regression estimates provide consistent 
evidence that markets respond positively when directors engage in more ‘buy’ trades prior to 
acquisition. Our finding is robust to trade variables, deal characteristics, firm-specific 
characteristics, and fixed effects of industry and year dummies. 
 
[Insert table 7 here] 
5.2.2. Endogeneity issues 
Our investigation may have reverse causality and endogeneity concerns in relation to 
market reaction and directors’ trade prior to acquisition announcement. To address the 
endogeneity issue, we follow Golubov et al. (2015) and control for firm fixed effects in all 
models estimated in Table 7. According to Golubov et al. (2015), firm fixed effects explain a 
significant variation of acquirer returns along with the firm and deal characteristics. We also 
estimate propensity-score matching (PSM) to address the selection bias based on observables 
firm characteristics and correlated omitted variable problems to mitigate the endogeneity 
concern of our estimation. We match the directors’ trading M&A firms with M&A firms 
without directors’ trading that have similar firm characteristics and investigate the impact of 
directors’ trading of the sample firms relative to their matched counterparts to account for the 
fact that directors’ trading is endogenous. 
Column 1 of Table 7 shows that the results are consistent with the results of Table 6 
even after we control year, industry and firm fixed effects. However, trade value scaled by 
market value of equity is lessening its level of significance from 1% to 5%. In subsequent 
columns of Table 7, we examine the reverse causality between forthcoming good deals and 
directors’ trading using the extraordinary acquirers concept discussed by Golubov et al. 
(2015). We define frequent and extraordinary acquirers respectively as those who completed 
five or more deals within a three-year period and at least three out of five announcements 
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generate positive three-day cumulative abnormal returns. If the directors’ trade prior to 
acquisition announcement is associated with the significant announcement period abnormal 
returns, then we expect a weak relation between extraordinary acquirers and announcement 
period abnormal returns. On the other hand, if investors react more positively due to good 
acquisition decisions made by extraordinary acquirers, markets should react more positively 
for such deals and one can expect a significant relationship between extraordinary acquirers 
and announcement period abnormal returns. The regression estimates reported in columns 2 
and 4 indicate that Dummy Extraordinary Bidders are not associated in a significant fashion 
with announcement period abnormal returns. In particular, column 5 shows that trade value 
scaled by market value of equity and net buy dummy are all insignificant for extraordinary 
acquirer sample, suggesting that as market already knows these bidders’ extraordinary skills, 
the directors’ trade does not convey any significant information to the market. Overall, 
Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate a strong association between directors’ trade and announcement 
period abnormal returns for full sample. These findings support our hypothesis 1 that 
acquiring directors’ net dollar value of trade prior to acquisition announcement is positively 
related to the announcement period abnormal returns of bidding firms. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
To reinforce the view that there is a systematic difference between the impact of 
M&A with directors’ trade and M&A without directors’ trade, we construct a propensity 
score matched sample of firms without directors’ trade. To obtain the control sample we 
estimate a probit model that regresses a categorical variable which represents 1 for directors’ 
trade and 0 for M&A without directors’ trade (Dummy IT) on all control variables in the main 
model. Based on the coefficients from this model, we compute a propensity score for each 
observation and then match each M&A announcement preceding with directors’ trading 
observation, without replacement, to a unique M&A announcement without directors’ trading 
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observation with the closest propensity score, based on a caliper width of 0.50. This 
procedure produces a sample of 586 matched pairs of M&A with and without directors’ trade 
firm-year observations (which is approximately 70 percent of total sample firm-years). The 
main results from our propensity score matching procedure are reported in Table 8. We first 
examine the covariate balance between firms with directors’ trade and firms without 
directors’ trade to mainly ensure that these firms are similar across all other dimensions 
except for the variable of interest (i.e. Dummy IT). The results for the covariate comparison 
(Panel A, Table 8) show that while there is a balance in the covariates across all the control 
variables, the dependent variables (i.e. three-day abnormal returns) are significantly higher 
for firms with directors’ trade. We then replicate the main model using the constructed 
propensity score matched sample. The results (Panel B, Table 8) continue to show a positive 
and significant association between directors’ trading and announcement period abnormal 
returns. This clarifies the concerns over whether markets react more positively due to the fact 
of good acquisitions or directors’ trade prior to acquisitions.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.2.3. The effect of pre-announcement period directors’ trading on abnormal M&A 
announcement period returns and acquisitions characteristics 
  In the next analysis, we re-estimate Equation [4] for three subsamples (stock-only 
acquisitions, stock-only public acquisitions, and stock-only private acquisitions) to have an 
in-depth analysis. In Table 9, we find consistent evidence of the strong relation between 
directors’ trading and abnormal returns for full sample as well as subsamples. In order to test 
hypothesis 2, we modify equation [4] and add an interaction variable Public Targets * 
NVMV. The results in column 1 unveil a significant negative coefficient for interaction 
variable of Public Targets * NVMV, which demonstrates that the dollar value of trades is 
negatively related to announcement period abnormal returns when acquiring public targets. 
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This finding implies that directors are probably involve in sell trade prior to acquisition 
announcement of public targets since the coefficient of net buy dummy variable is still 
positive and significant at 10 percent level. The subsample analysis reveals that the positive 
coefficient of NVMV for full sample stems from the acquisition of private target sample. The 
findings suggest that directors opportunistically trade prior to acquisition announcements, 
which is supported by the significant and negative coefficient of NVMV (-0.1894) for public 
target sample and significant positive coefficient of NVMV (0.1755) for private target sample, 
respectively. The findings provide strong support for our hypothesis 2 that acquiring 
directors’ net dollar value of trade prior to acquisition of public targets is negatively related to 
the announcement period abnormal returns of bidding firms. These results are consistent with 
a number of earlier established findings such as corporate monitoring hypothesis (Chang, 
1998), liquidity hypothesis (Fuller et al., 2002) and managerial motive hypothesis (Draper 
and Paudyal, 2006) that demonstrate that acquisitions of private targets are more value-
creating than acquisitions of public targets. Therefore, directors’ net dollar value of trades 
prior to acquisition of public targets conveys negative signals to the market about future value 
of deals. Although the dollar value of trade is negatively related with abnormal returns for 
public targets sample, we find evidence that directors’ net buy trades have a significant and 
positive relationship with the announcement period returns irrespective of target 
organizational form. This supports our main findings that shareholders perceive the 
acquisition is value-creating when directors buy shares during the pre-acquisition period.  
We investigated how directors’ trades prior to stock-financed acquisitions impound 
information to the stock market by testing an interaction variable in equation 4. Based on our 
arguments in section 2 for hypothesis 3, we expect that the directors’ net trading prior to 
stock-only payment method will signal twofold information based on the organizational form 
of targets. To test hypothesis 3, we re-estimate the model [4] and test the interaction variable 
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(Dummy Public Targets * NVMV) for stock-only acquisitions sample. The results show that 
Dummy Public Targets * NVMV is negative and significant at one percent level, implying 
that dollar value of trade is negatively related to stock-financed public target acquisitions 
during announcement period. The regression estimate shows that dollar value of directors’ 
trade prior to stock-only public target acquisitions signals negative information to the market. 
However, the Dummy Net Buyer variable generates significant positive coefficient for stock-
only full sample. This implies that directors’ buy trades signal value to the shareholders even 
when bidders exchange stocks in acquisitions. To interpret our main findings for stock-only 
sample, we estimate two sets of regressions: (i) stock-only public targets subsample and (ii) 
stock-only private targets subsample. The results provide strong support for our hypothesis 3 
that directors’ net dollar value of trade prior to stock-financed public targets is significantly 
penalized by stock markets, and net dollar value of trade prior to stock-financed private 
targets is significantly rewarded by stock markets, indicating opportunistic directors’ trading 
based on private information.  
Louis (2013) argues that when directors are aware of their overvalued stocks, they are 
more likely to sell them than to buy. Our results support the above argument for public target 
acquisitions as the dollar value of directors’ trade variable is negative and statistically 
significant for stock-only payment method sample. Although Humphery-Jenner and Powell 
(2011) report significant positive abnormal returns for both stock-financed public and private 
targets acquisitions, our study confirms that the magnitude of the returns generated by these 
bidders is conditional to directors’ trading prior to acquisition announcements. This implies 
that directors’ trades are informative and market reacts in line with the motive of directors’ 
trades in Australia. Our findings support hypothesis 3 that directors’ net dollar value of trade 
is negatively (positively) related to announcement period abnormal returns for stock-financed 
public (private) targets. Overall, the results show that the size of the dollar value of directors’ 
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trade materially affects the abnormal returns of the bidders and the direction of these effects 
is conditional on the type of targets acquired and the method of payment used in acquisitions. 
These results are consistent after controlling the main bid and firm characteristics. In 
summary, we can state that the announcement period abnormal returns for stock-financed 
acquisitions are explained significantly by directors’ net dollar value of trade prior to such 
acquisition announcements. 
 
5.2.4. The effect of pre-announcement period directors’ trading on abnormal M&A 
announcement period returns and governance characteristics of the acquiring firms 
Considering the importance of corporate governance, a number of studies provide 
evidence that corporate insiders have less leeway to maximize their own personal gain in a 
stronger governance structure (see Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In this section, we investigate the 
effect of governance of the bidding firm and its association with the directors’ trading 
patterns and the stock market reactions around acquisition announcement. We start by 
examining the effect of governance quality on trading performance using two proxies: (i) 
percentage of independent directors on the board (see Byrd and Hickman, 1992), and (ii) 
percentage of blockholdings (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Equation [4] is modified to 
incorporate additional governance variables and re-estimated using the full sample by adding 
four additional explanatory variables: (i) Percentage of Independent Directors, (ii) NVMV * 
Percentage of Independent Directors, (iii) Percentage of Blockholdings, (iv) NVMV 
*Percentage of Blockholdings.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Table 10 reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of the regression output 
classifying the sample based on the two governance proxies: the percentage of independent 
directors on the board and the percentage of blockholdings of the total outstanding shares. 
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We classify the full sample into four subsamples: (i) better governed firms (if the percentage 
of independent directors is above median), (ii) poorly governed firms (if the percentage of 
independent directors is below median), (iii) highly monitored firms (if the percentage of 
blockholdings is above median), and (iv) less monitored firms (if the percentage of 
blockholdings is below median). The first column of Table 10 reports the regression output 
for the full sample using the proportion of independent directors on the board. The results 
show that the coefficient of the interaction variable (NVMV*Percentage of Independent 
Directors) is negative and statistically significant. This finding demonstrates that the higher 
percentage of independent directors on a board systematically reduces the market reaction of 
the bidding firms when directors trade prior to acquisition announcement. This result 
supports the view that in better governed Australian firms, it is difficult for directors to get 
involved in opportunistic trading. We further split this sample into two groups: better 
governed firms and poorly governed firms. The regression estimates of these two subsamples 
support the main findings of the full sample. The trade value scaled by market value of equity 
variable is positive and statistically significant for poorly governed firms at 1 percent level, 
while it is insignificant and negative for better governed firms. This finding supports the 
arguments that the information content of directors’ trading depends on the firm’s governance 
characteristics. 
We re-estimate the regression for the full sample and for the two subsamples based on 
another proxy of good governance; the blockholdings of the firms. The larger blockholdings 
are said to have better monitoring on firms’ performance (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find that the price reaction after purchases is smaller in the presence of 
blockholders who are likely to monitor management. The regression estimate for the full 
sample in Table 10 shows that the coefficient of the interaction variable for the NVMV* 
Percentage of Blockholdings is negative and significant at 1 percent level. The analysis of 
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two subsamples based on blockholdings indicates that higher blockholdings (better 
monitoring) in firms are associated with significant negative market reactions, whereas lower 
blockholdings in the firm result in significant positive market reactions when directors trade 
prior to acquisition announcements. The evidence suggests that rent extraction is not easy for 
directors, especially through the route of trading one to three months prior to acquisition in 
those firms in which blockholders and independent directors have a significant presence. The 
findings are consistent with prior literature (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Hirschey and Zaima, 1989) 
and provide strong support for hypothesis 4 that acquiring directors’ dollar value of trade 
prior to acquisition announcement is positively related to the announcement period abnormal 
returns of bidding firms in a weak governance system. 
 
5.2.5. Additional Tests 
We estimate a number of additional tests to check the robustness of our findings; 
these are reported in Appendix 1. First, in model 1, we re-estimate the regression models 
presented in Table 6 using the five-day market model cumulative abnormal returns instead of 
three-day window as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar to the three-
day event window. Second, to understand whether our findings are sensitive to other returns 
estimation models, we re-estimate the model using two other return measures. We estimate 
the model using three-day buy and hold abnormal returns as dependent variable. The results 
in model 2 show that the trade value scaled by market value of equity (0.2453) is still 
significant at 5 percent level. Third, we estimate the model using the market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The coefficient of trade value scaled 
by market value of equity (0.1452) is qualitatively similar to coefficient (0.1546) reported in 
standard market model. Finally, the main findings do not disappear when we use the quantity 
of shares traded scaled by outstanding total shares as a test variable in the model, where the 
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dependent variable is three-day cumulative abnormal returns calculated similar to Equation 
(2). This implies that the positive influence of directors’ trading on the acquisition period 
abnormal returns is robust to various returns estimations and proxies of directors’ trade.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine the acquiring company directors’ trading prior to acquisition 
announcement in order to understand the opportunistic behavior of directors. Along with this, 
our motive of examining directors’ trading is whether such trading can be informative for 
outside investors or not. The analysis of M&A announcements preceding with directors’ 
trading show the level of trading, patterns and information content of trading in listed 
acquiring firms up to three months before takeover announcements. Using the acquisition 
announcements during the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2012, our initial analysis 
provides evidence that the pre-announcement net dollar trading value (the difference between 
the dollar value of buy transactions and sell transactions) of acquiring directors is positively 
related to announcement-period abnormal returns. 
We find that acquiring directors show opportunistic behavior in their trading in one to 
three months before announcement of acquisition. Such trading of directors has significant 
information content to outside investors and shareholders. Acquirers whose directors are net 
buyers of shares prior to acquisition announcement (acquisition of private as well as public 
targets) earn significantly higher abnormal returns than acquiring directors who are net sellers 
in the stock market. This relation is stronger for private targets acquisitions. However, we do 
not find similar evidence for net sell trade. The results remain robust after controlling all the 
bid and firm characteristics in regression framework. Our results suggest that those stock-
financed acquisitions in which directors indulged in significant trading generate more 
abnormal announcement return.  
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We further show that governance mechanism is the key to the information content of 
directors’ trade. We find that the effect of pre-announcement directors’ trading on 
announcement-period abnormal return is mainly driven by the group of acquirers with poorer 
governance (lower blockholdings and percentage of independent directors on the board), 
whereas in better governed firms, it is not easy for directors to earn abnormal returns on the 
basis of their probable private information, while trading prior to acquisition announcement. 
Our paper contributes to the emerging branch of M&A literature in which directors’ 
trading is involved (Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). Directors can anticipate the value creation 
aspect of acquisition prior to announcement of acquisition and be able to take positions to 
earn abnormal returns from such acquisition decisions. Our analysis also indicates that while 
evaluating an acquisition, other than looking into deal characteristics, outside investors 
should also look into directors’ trading prior to such acquisition announcements. 
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Table 1: Distribution of M&A Announcements 
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y
ear-by-year analysis of acquisition (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) for the period 2004 to 2012. Panels A and B show time and industry distributions respectively for 
ASX listed bidding firms with average deal value (million), average market value and average of percentage shares acquired. Industry classification is based on ICB 
reported in Datastream. Deal values are collected from SDC. 
  
Panel-A: M&A Announcements by Year 
Year No. of 
 Announcements 
% No. of 
Announcements 
Deal Value m 
(Mean) 
Market Value m 
 (Mean) 
% of Shares Acquired 
(Mean) 
2004 34 7.61% 49.60 495.11 97.55 
2005 65 14.54% 95.55 1856.50 98.92 
2006 70 15.66% 211.88 1690.89 94.75 
2007 86 19.24% 49.97 1286.84 98.89 
2008 75 16.78% 130.64 1233.51 95.93 
2009 60 13.42% 141.46 2658.63 95.54 
2010 25 5.59% 180.65 268.11 93.72 
2011 18 4.03% 35.14 1375.87 84.33 
2012 14 3.13% 25.00 495.11 97.55 
Total 447.00 100.00% 919.89 11360.57 - 
Mean 49.67 11.11% 102.21 1262.29 95.24 
Median 60.00 13.42% 95.55 1286.84 95.93 
Panel B: M&A Announcements by Industry 
Year No. of 
 Announcements 
% No. of 
Announcements 
Deal Value  
(Mean) 
Market Value 
 (Mean) 
% of Shares Acquired 
(Mean) 
Mining 108 24.16% 48.50 1811.42 97.61 
Support Services 68 15.21% 15.41 590.29 99.06 
Industrial Metals & Mining 29 6.49% 56.35 583.19 99.40 
Financial Services 21 4.70% 611.23 3022.36 88.25 
Media 20 4.47% 30.89 642.53 93.66 
Oil & Gas Producers 19 4.25% 32.14 143.01 83.38 
Software & Computer Services 17 3.80% 8.55 78.64 100.00 
Industrial Engineering 15 3.36% 10.24 132.05 100.00 
Health Care Equip. & Services 12 2.68% 35.61 180.64 100.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Directors’ Trade 
Note: This table reports the directors’ trade year by year (panel A) and the trade patterns (panel B) three months prior to acquisition announcements for the period 2004 to 2012. 
Panels A and B show the average quantity and the average total value of directors’ trade by years and by three months prior to acquisition announcements for ASX listed bidding 
firms respectively using full sample, public target and private target. 
 
Panel A: Directors’ Trading By Year 
 Aggregate Measures Net Measures 
 Buy Sell Buy Sell 
 Year 
No. Average 
Quantity (ml) 
Average 
Value ($ml) 
No. Average 
Quantity (ml) 
Average 
Value ($ml) 
No. Average 
Quantity (ml) 
Average 
Value ($ml) 
No. Average 
Quantity (ml) 
Average 
Value ($ml) 
2004 21 0.19 0.08 13 3.52 0.54 19 0.15 0.06 12 3.71 0.61 
2005 46 0.54 0.14 19 1.04 0.60 44 0.56 0.15 15 1.30 0.73 
2006 52 0.54 2.05 18 1.55 0.71 46 0.60 2.29 16 1.71 0.79 
2007 59 0.37 0.30 27 3.29 5.90 53 0.26 0.29 25 3.27 6.46 
2008 60 0.70 0.22 15 0.66 1.06 59 0.69 0.23 12 0.32 1.20 
2009 37 0.29 0.04 23 3.35 5.27 32 0.28 0.03 23 3.26 5.28 
2010 19 0.71 0.07 6 5.52 0.15 20 0.76 0.07 5 6.46 0.18 
2011 15 0.30 0.29 3 1.22 2.80 15 0.30 0.29 3 1.22 2.80 
2012 11 2.33 0.59 3 0.09 0.85 11 2.33 0.59 3 0.09 0.85 
Average 320 0.66 0.42 127 2.25 1.99 299 0.66 0.45 114 2.37 2.10 
Panel B: Directors’ Trading Three Month Periods Prior to Acquisition Announcements 
 -3 Month -2 Month -1 Month 
Net Buy No. Average Quantity 
(ml) 
Average Value 
($ml) 
No. Average Quantity 
(ml) 
Average Value 
($ml) 
No. Average Quantity 
(ml) 
Average Value 
($ml) 
Full 127 0.49 0.22 89 0.30 0.16 83 0.89 1.37 
Public 55 0.77 0.29 29 0.27 0.28 25 1.22 0.20 
Private 72 0.28 0.16 60 0.32 0.10 58 0.75 1.88 
Net Sell No. Average Quantity 
(ml) 
Average Value 
($ml) 
No. Average Quantity 
(ml) 
Average Value 
($ml) 
No. Average Quantity 
(ml) 
Average Value 
($ml) 
Full 50 3.97 3.46 32 1.05 1.39 32 1.76 3.83 
Public 16 4.50 5.16 13 0.85 0.94 19 0.74 4.87 
Private 34 3.72 2.66 19 1.19 1.71 13 3.25 2.31 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Directors’ Trade and Deal Characteristics by Target Organisational Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
i
s
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
t
he directors’ trade patterns for the full sample, public targets and private targets (Panel A) and deal characteristics (Panel B) for the period 2004 to 2012. Panel A 
shows the total and average quantity and value of directors’ trade for full sample, public targets and private targets by three months prior to acquisition 
announcements for ASX listed bidding firms respectively. Panel B shows the percentage of shares acquired, deal value, market value of equity and bidders 
abnormal returns for three-day event window. 
 
 
Panel A: Directors’ Trading by Target Public Status 
 Full Sample Public Private  
All Trade 
No. of trades  413 157 256 
Total quantity (ml) 451.86 177.39 274.46 
Average quantity of the trade (ml) 1.09 1.12 1.07 
Total value of the trade ($ml) 495.69 216.02 279.66 
Average size of the directors’ trades ($ml) 1.20 1.38 1.09 
Net Buy 
No. of trades                         299                      109                      190 
Total quantity (ml) 163.54  80.35   83.19 
Average quantity of the trade (ml)        0.55     0.74     0.44 
Total value of the trade ($ml) 155.48 28.80 126.68 
Average size of the director’s trade ($ml)        0.52     0.26      0.67 
Net Sell 
No. of trades                         114                        48                         66 
Total quantity (ml) 288.32 97.05 191.28 
Average quantity of the trade (ml)     2.53   2.02     2.90 
Total value of the trade ($ml) 340.22 187.23 152.99 
Average size of the director’s trade ($ml)    2.98     3.90     2.32 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics by Target Public Status 
Average Percentage of Shares Acquired      96.10   93.19  97.57 
Average Value of the Deal ($ ml)  113.67 263.96 18.78 
Average Market Value of Equity ($ ml) 1704.40 2931.07 929.89 
Bidder’s Mean Abnormal Return with Insider 
Trading (%): Day -1 to Day +1 
               3.84
*** 
[447] 
              3.15
*** 
[173] 
            4.28
*** 
[274] 
Bidder’s Mean Abnormal Return without 
Insider Trading (%): Day -1 to Day +1 
                3.17
*** 
[1878] 
               2.31
*** 
[964] 
             4.31
*** 
[915] 
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Table 4: Announcement Period Abnormal Returns of M&A Sample with Insider Trading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Panel A reports mean abnormal returns for the three samples (full sample, public targets and private targets) together with differences in mean abnormal 
returns between net buy and net sell groups for three-day event window period around the announcement of acquisitions. Panel B reports mean announcement 
period abnormal returns for four payment methods (cash only, stock only, mix and others). A 
***, (**), (*)
 indicates statistical significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Directors’ Trading and M&A Abnormal Returns 
 Aggregate Measures Net Measures 
 Aggregate Buy Aggregate Sell Mean Differences Net Buy Net Sell Mean Differences 
Full Sample 0.0446
*** 
(7.85) 
[320] 
0.0234
***
(3.54) 
[127] 
0.0212
**  
(1.91) 
[447] 
0.0455
***
(7.88) 
[299] 
0.0206
***
(2.82) 
[114] 
0.0249
**
(2.39) 
[413] 
Public 0.0385
*** 
(3.50) 
[122] 
0.0042    (0.42) 
[51] 
0.0343
**     
(1.88) 
[173] 
0.0440
***
(4.05) 
[109] 
0.0092     (0.95) 
[48] 
0.0348
** 
(1.97) 
[157] 
Private 0.0474
*** 
(7.24) 
[198] 
0.0348
*** 
(3.68) 
[76] 
0.0126    (1.04) 
[274] 
0.0463
***
(6.99) 
[190] 
0.0289
***
(2.77) 
[66] 
0.0174    (1.35) 
[256] 
Public-Private -0.0089    (-0.74) 
[320] 
-0.0306
**   
(-2.15) 
[127] 
- 
-0.0023    (-0.19) 
[299] 
-0.0197     (-1.33) 
[114] 
- 
Panel B: Directors’ Trading, Payment Method and M&A Abnormal Returns 
 Cash only Stock Only Mix Others Cash-Stock Cash-mix 
Net buy 0.0175
***
(3.02) 
[91] 
0.0755
*** 
(4.72) 
[66] 
0.0541
***  
(6.13) 
[127] 
0.0107     (0.34) 
[15] 
-0.0580
***
(-3.81) 
[157] 
-0.0366
***  
(-3.17) 
[218] 
Net sell -0.0037     (-0.57) 
[45] 
0.0437
**
  (2.18) 
[20] 
0.0347
**    
(2.41) 
[38] 
0.0300     (0.94) 
[9] 
-0.0474
***
  (-2.87) 
[65] 
-0.0384
*** 
(-2.56) 
[83] 
Net Buy-Net Sell 0.0212
** 
 (2.25) 
[136] 
0.0318     (1.02) 
[86] 
0.0194    (1.07) 
[165] 
-0.0283    (-0.42) 
[23] 
- - 
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Table 5: Multivariate CAR Analysis of Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates and their respective t-values (in brackets) for the multiple regression equation [3] for full 
sample. The dependent variable is the bidder’s three-day abnormal returns and the independent variables included in the model are insider 
trading dummy variable (which takes the value of 1 when directors trade prior to acquisitions announcement, otherwise zero), three bid 
characteristics (stock only dummy variable, public targets dummy variable and relative size variable) and three firm characteristics (in market 
value of equity, net income scaled by total asset and cash flow scaled by total asset). A 
***, (**), (*)
 indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 
(5%), (10%) level.  The issue of heteroscedasticity was addressed by using White’s adjustment procedure. 
 
 
  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant    -0.0035
***      
(-2.77)  -0.0075
***            
(-3.72) -0.0029    
            
(-0.81)   -0.0197
**             
(-2.21) 
Dummy IT    0.0425
***       
(8.71) 0.0394
***  
         (8.41) 0.0369
***
         (7.70) 0.0371
***
         (7.40) 
Dummy Stock Only 
- 
0.0118
***
          (3.47)  0.0096
***
         (2.76) 0.0094
***
         (2.62) 
Dummy Public Target 
- 
 -0.0059
*      
        (-1.77) -0.0063
*
          (-1.86) -0.0066
* 
     
       
(-1.80) 
Relative Size 
- 
 0.0050
***
           (3.06) 0.0037
**
          (2.18) 0.0035
**         
     (2.01) 
Ln Market Value 
- - 
-0.0007  
      
     (-1.15) -0.0010   
       
    (-1.35) 
NITA 
- - 
0.0006            (1.57) 0.0007
*
            (1.80) 
CFTA 
- - 
-0.0011           (-1.34) -0.0011           (-1.44) 
Industry Fixed Effects 
- - - 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
- 
-  - Yes 
F-Statistics           148.27
***
  44.37
***
    21.56
***
   7.11
***
 
N 1708 1708 1708 1708 
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Table 6: Multivariate CAR Analysis of M&A Sample with 
Insider Trading 
 
 
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates and their respective t-values (in brackets) for the multiple regression equation [4] for full sample. The 
dependent variable is the bidder’s three-day abnormal returns and the independent variables included in the model are two insider trading variables 
(dollar value of trade scaled by market value of equity, dummy variable of net buyer), three bid characteristics (stock only dummy variable, public 
targets dummy variable and relative size variable) and three firm characteristics (in market value of equity, net income scaled by total asset and cash 
flow scaled by total asset). A 
***, (**), (*)
 indicates statistical significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level.  The issue of heteroscedasticity was addressed by 
using White’s adjustment procedure. 
  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant    0.0362
***          
(7.80)  0.0040
                  
(0.47) 0.0359
**
 
            
(2.49)   -0.0604
*             
(-1.88) 
NVMV    0.1922
***        
(3.86) 0.1825
***
        (3.87) 0.1888
*** 
       (3.61)    0.1626
***  
       (2.90) 
Dummy Net Buyer 
- 
0.0224
**  
        (2.56) 0.0177
**   
       (2.04)    0.0178
*        
     (1.76) 
Dummy Stock Only 
- 
 0.0244
*    
        (1.85) 0.0234
* 
          (1.76) 0.0358
** 
         (2.55) 
Dummy Public Target 
- 
-0.0127         (-1.33) -0.0125           (-1.29) -0.0064          (-0.50) 
Relative Size 
- 
  0.0672
***
    
      
(4.39) 0.0513
*** 
  
       
(3.02) 0.0540
***
  
       
(3.07) 
Ln Market Value 
- - 
-0.0054
**
        (-2.54) -0.0071
*** 
    (-2.65) 
NITA 
- - 
0.0499
**      
     (2.15) 0.0481
*
  
      
   (1.87) 
CFTA 
- - 
-0.0421           (-1.13) -0.0273         (-0.68) 
Industry Fixed Effects 
- - - 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
- - - 
Yes 
F-Statistics   8.81
***
  13.32
***
    8.31
***
   2.43
***
 
N 413 413 413 413 
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    Table 7: Multivariate CAR Analysis of M&A Sample 
with Insider Trading 
 
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates and their respective t-values (in brackets) for the multiple regression equation [4] for full sample. The dependent variable is the 
bidder’s three-day abnormal returns and the independent variables included in the model are two insider trading variables (dollar value of trade scaled by market value of 
equity, dummy variable of net buyer), five bid characteristics (stock only dummy variable, public targets dummy variable, relative size variable, dummy multiple bidder, 
dummy extraordinary bidder) and three firm characteristics (in market value of equity, net income scaled by total asset and cash flow scaled by total asset). A 
***, (**), (*)
 
indicates statistical significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. The issue of heteroscedasticity was addressed by using White’s adjustment procedure. 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.0184         (0.59)  0.0371  
              
(1.22)  0.0169
             
(0.54)   0.0186           (0.60) -0.0212        (0.27) 
NVMV 0.1286
** 
      (1.96)  0.1312
**
         (1.96)  0.1293
** 
      (1.97)   0.1283
**
        (1.95) -0.0788        (-0.57) 
Dummy Net Buyer 0.0182
*        
   (1.76)  0.0202
**
         (1.93)  0.0183
*
        (1.77) 0.0182
*  
        (1.76) 0.0079         (0.41) 
Dummy Stock Only 0.0256
** 
      (2.59)  0.0383
***
        (3.21)  0.0244
**
       (2.44)    0.0257
**    
     (2.59) 0.0085
      
      (0.51) 
Dummy Public Target -0.0075       (-0.72)  -0.0081          (-0.76) -0.0078        (-0.74) -0.0074         (-0.71) 0.0211         (0.75) 
Relative Size  0.0373
***
 
     
(4.57)  0.0117
** 
        (2.20)  0.0372
***
      (4.54)    0.0373
***         
(4.56) 0.0069         (0.21) 
Dummy Multiple Bidder (Acq>4) - -0.0187          (-1.43) -0.0099        (-0.89) - - 
Dummy Extraordinary Bidder - 0.0175            (1.12) -   0.0034          (0.26) - 
Ln Market Value -0.0036        (1.43) -0.0056
**
        (-2.11) -0.0029        (-1.10)  -0.0037         (-1.45) -0.0009         (-0.16) 
NITA -0.0086  
     
   (1.48)  0.0021           (1.29) -0.0091        (-1.55)   -0.0086         (-1.47) -0.0341         (-0.44) 
CFTA 0.0022        (1.38) -0.0092          (-1.55)  0.0021          (1.30)    0.0023          (1.40) 0.0094         (0.81) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi 92.25
***
   80.36
***
   93.00
***
  92.03
***
  35.76
*
 
N 413 413 413 413 83 
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Table 8: Multivariate CAR Analysis of Propensity Score Matching of M&A 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Comparison of Mean Three-Day Abnormal Returns Based on M&A with IT Firm and M&A without IT Matched 
Firm 
 Full Sample Net Buy Net Sell 
 Sample 
Firms 
Matched 
Firms 
Diff. Sample 
Firms 
Matched 
Firms 
Diff. Sample 
Firms 
Matched 
Firms 
Diff. 
Three-day 
Abnormal 
Returns 
0.0431 -0.0063 0.0494
***
 0.0452 -0.0049 0.0500
***
 0.0226 0.0038 0.0187
*
 
Dummy Stock 
Only 
0.7577 0.2287 0.5290 0.2218 0.2469 -0.0251 0.1789 0.1895 -0.0105 
Dummy 
Public Target 
0.4027 0.4061 -0.0034 0.4059 0.4184 -0.0126 0.4526 0.4632 -0.0105 
Relative Size 0.3431 0.3781 -0.0350 0.3464 0.3840 -0.0376 0.2098 0.6690 -0.4592 
Ln MV 4.2298 4.2065 0.0234 4.3433 4.2726 0.0707 4.6592 4.1068 0.5524 
FCTA -0.0689 -0.1126 0.0438 -0.0447 -0.0541 -0.0094 -0.0793 -0.1604 0.0811 
NITA -0.1677 -0.2782 0.1105 -0.1156 -0.1685 0.0529 -0.2237 -0.4978 0.2741 
Panel B: Regression Estimates Using Sample and Matched Firm 
 Full Sample Net Buy Net Sell 
Intercept -0.0554
**
 
(-2.27) 
-0.0922
**
 
(-2.34) 
-0.0411 
(-0.79) 
Dummy IT  0.0419
***
 
(6.34) 
0.0509
***
 
(7.24) 
0.0015 
(0.13) 
Dummy Stock Only 0.0149
**
 
(2.22) 
0.0222
**
 
(2.30) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
Dummy Public Target 0.0028 
(-0.36) 
-0.0005 
(-0.07) 
-0.0026 
(-0.19) 
Relative Size 0.0144
**
 
(2.20) 
0.01224
*
 
(1.80) 
0.0360
**
 
(2.15) 
Ln MV -0.0043
***
 
(-3.11) 
-0.0053
***
 
(-3.22) 
-0.0032 
(-1.17) 
FCTA -0.0004 
(-0.05) 
-0.0092 
(-0.80) 
0.0007 
(0.04) 
NITA 0.0046 
(1.47) 
0.0141
**
 
(2.29) 
0.0014 
(0.26) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.1407       0.1542    0.1386 
F-Statistic 4.99
***
                        4.62
***
                1.91
**
 
N 586 456 130 
This table presents the propensity score matching test results. Panel A reports the comparison of mean three-day abnormal returns using 
M&A with IT versus M&A without IT. Panel B presents the regression results of the three-day abnormal returns on bid and firm control 
variables using the propensity score-matched sample. All model specifications employ robust standard errors, which are reported in the 
parentheses below each coefficient. 
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Table 9: Multivariate CAR Analysis of M&A Subsamples with Insider Trading 
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates and their respective t-values (in brackets) for the multiple regression equation [4] for full samples and subsamples (public 
targets, private targets, stock only payment methods). The dependent variable is the bidder’s three-day abnormal returns and the independent variables included in the model 
are two insider trading variables (dollar value of trade scaled by market value of equity, dummy variable of net buyer), three bid characteristics (stock only dummy variable, 
public targets dummy variable and relative size variable) and three firm characteristics (ln market value of equity, net income scaled by total asset and cash flow scaled by 
total assets). A 
***, (**), (*)
 indicates statistical significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level.  The issue of heteroscedasticity was addressed by using White’s adjustment procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Target Category Payment Method Category 
Independent Variable Full Sample Public Targets Private Targets Stock-only 
Sample 
Stock-only Public Stock-only 
Private 
Constant -0.0430       (-1.38) -0.0347    
           
(-1.07) -0.1349
              
(-1.53)   -0.1288     (-2.04)   -0.1181     (-1.65) -0.2675
**     
(-5.05) 
NVMV 0.1826
***
      (4.88)  -0.1894
**   
       (-1.95) 0.1755
***
        (3.48)    0.28847
* 
   (1.93)   -1.2717
***  
(-4.37)   0.4829
***
    (2.83) 
Dummy Net Buyer 0.0165
*
       (1.90) 0.0306
*      
       (1.90)   0.0219
**
         (2.13)   0.0551
**
     (2.37)    0.0851
 
      (1.54)  0.0441
*  
     (1.71) 
Dummy Stock Only 0.0271
**
       (2.18) 0.0302
 
            (1.32) 0.0289
**
 
 
        (2.36) - - - 
Dummy Public Target -0.0026       (-0.23) - - 0.0028      (0.11) - - 
Dummy Public Target * NVMV -0.3749
***
    (-3.19) - - -1.1782
***
  (-5.08) - - 
Relative Size 0.0344
*** 
     (3.20) 0.0255 
    
    
        
(1.44)  0.0458
***
 
           
(3.82) 0.0447
***
   (4.10) 0.0566
***
   (4.06) 0.0276
**         
(2.68) 
Ln Market Value -0.0053
*** 
   (-2.85) -0.0058
*
          (-1.70)  -0.0076
*** 
     (-3.44) -0.0086
 
     (-1.39) -0.0067
 
     (-0.87) -0.0136
*    
   (-2.03) 
NITA 0.0007         (0.65)  0.0166  
        
     (0.83)  0.0251
         
     (1.47)  0.0016       (0.05) -0.0720      (-1.55) 0.0329 
       
   (0.64) 
CFTA -0.0005       (-0.15) -0.0043           (-1.30)  0.0138
*
           (1.81) -0.0195      (-0.25) 0.1412      ( 1.30) -0.0067 
   
    (-0.08) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistics 4.00
***
 1.47
*
      4.70
***
 2.78
***
 1.56            3.85
***
 
N 413 157 256 86 37               49 
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Table 10: Multivariate CAR Analysis of M&A Sample with Insider Trading 
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates and their respective t-values (in brackets) for the multiple regression modified equation [4] for full sample. The dependent variable is the bidder’s three-day 
abnormal returns and the independent variables included in the model are two insider trading variables (dollar value of trade scaled by market value of equity, dummy variable of net buyer), number of 
interaction variables (trade size*% of independent directors and trade size *% of blockholdings), corporate governance variables (% of independent directors and % of blockholdings), three bid characteristics 
(stock only dummy variable, public targets dummy variable and relative size variable) and three firm characteristics (ln market value of equity, net income scaled by total asset and cash flow scaled by total 
asset). A ***, (**), (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level.  The issue of heteroscedasticity was addressed by using White’s adjustment procedure. 
 % of Independent Directors % of Blockholdings 
Independent Variable Full Sample Better Governed 
Firms 
Poorer Governed 
Firms 
Full Sample Highly Monitored 
Firms 
Less Monitored Firms 
Constant -0.0200    (-0.50) 0.0699    
        
(1.35) -0.0819
    
 
         
(-1.49) -0.0288 
 
  
        
(-0.66) -0.1148
***        
(-2.99) 0.0410  
 
  
            
(0.74) 
NVMV  0.1806
*** 
   (4.46) -0.3490         (-1.31)  0.1752
*** 
 
         
(2.63) 0.4085
***
     (5.60) -0.5388
**
      (-2.14) 0.1173
**  
          (2.50) 
Percentage of Independent Directors -0.0033      (-0.12) - - - - - 
Percentage of Blockholdings - - - 0.0115          (0.32) - - 
NVMV *% of Independent Directors -1.0174
** 
  (-2.13) - - - - - 
NVMV *% of Blockholdings - - - -2.7601
***
     (-3.40) - - 
Dummy Net Buyer  0.0080       (0.68) -0.0013         (-0.07)  0.0232   
  
       (1.16) 0.0058         (0.50)  0.0255
*
         (1.62) -0.0102            (-0.50) 
Dummy Stock Only  0.0276
*
      (1.61) 0.0008 
  
        (0.03)  0.0449
*  
         (1.87)  0.0326
** 
       (1.93)  0.0199
    
        (1.05)  0.0715
** 
          (2.15) 
Dummy Public Target -0.0110     (-0.82) -0.0187        (-1.26) -0.0195         (-0.79) -0.0113
 
        (-0.87) -0.0203         (-1.46) -0.0075          (-0.30) 
Relative Size 0.0443
*
   
   
(1.89)  0.0532
 
  
          
(1.03)  0.0433
      
 
          
(1.40) 0.0457
**
 
        
(1.98)  0.0866
***          
(2.96) -0.0160
 
  
           
(-0.27) 
Ln Market Value -0.0076
**
   (-2.06) -0.0080
**
     (-1.98) -0.0067
 
         (-0.77) -0.0071
**
      (-2.18) -0.0038
 
        (-0.84) -0.0055
 
         (-0.89) 
NITA -0.0529
*  
   (1.61) 0.1666
        
   (-1.22)  0.0512   
       
    (1.32) 0.0494
     
     (1.52) -0.0158
    
     (-0.19) 0.0561    
 
       (0.81) 
CFTA -0.0497      (-1.01) 0.1985
** 
      (1.98) -0.0633         (-1.10) -0.0619
    
     (-1.27) 0.0780
     
     (0.98) -0.1878
**   
       (-2.18) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistics 1.50
**
 1.13 1.20 1.60
**
 2.16
***
 1.38
*
 
N 281 139 142 284 142 142 
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Appendix 1 Multivariate CAR Analysis of M&A Sample with Insider Trading 
 
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates and their respective t-values (in brackets) for the multiple regression equation [4] for full sample. The 
dependent variable is the bidder’s five-day market model abnormal returns in model 1, three-day buy and hold abnormal returns in model 2, three-day 
market adjusted abnormal returns in model 3 and three-day market model abnormal returns in model 4. The independent variables included in the 
model are two insider trading variables (dollar value of trade scaled by market value of equity in model 1 to 3 and quantity traded scaled by total shares 
in model 4, dummy variable of net buyer), three bid characteristics (stock only dummy variable, public targets dummy variable and relative size 
variable) and three firm characteristics (ln market value of equity, net income scaled by total asset and cash flow scaled by total asset). A 
***, (**), (*)
 
indicates statistical significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level.  The issue of heteroscedasticity was addressed by using White’s adjustment procedure. 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.0261   
           
(0.31)  -0.0202
                 
(-0.34) 0.0410    
            
(1.46)    0.0271
                   
(1.12) 
NVMV   0.1546
***         
(2.67) 0.2453
** 
         (2.49) 0.1452
*** 
       (3.57) - 
Quantity traded scaled by outstanding shares - - -    0.0021
**    
       (2.43) 
Dummy Net Buyer 0.0330
** 
       (2.52) 0.0289
*    
         (1.61) 0.0178
*     
       (1.71)    0.0179
*        
     (1.62) 
Dummy Stock Only     0.0080          (0.80) -0.0149
        
      (-0.67) 0.0254
***
        (2.81) 0.0261
*** 
         (2.93) 
Dummy Public Target -0.0113        (-0.76) -0.0039           (-0.13) -0.0007           (-0.06) -0.0036          (-0.28) 
Relative Size 0.0237
**
       (2.01)   -0.0070
 
     
      
(-0.69) 0.0126
        
  
       
(1.07) 0.0134       
       
(1.10) 
Ln Market Value -0.0063
**
     (-2.40) 0.0031            (0.66) -0.0057
***
       (-2.59) -0.0051
**  
      (-2.22) 
NITA 0.0024         (1.17) 0.0007            (0.52) 0.0004   
      
     (0.48) 0.0014
*
   
      
   (1.61) 
CFTA -0.0040        (-0.56) 0.0018            (0.28) -0.0038           (-1.16) -0.0033         (-0.96) 
Industry Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
F-Statistics   1.61
***
         0.61
*
    1.78
***
   2.01
***
 
N 413 413 413 413 
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Information Content of Directors’ Trading Around Acquisitions 
 
Highlights 
 
 Acquiring directors’ trading and returns around takeover announcements. 
 Pre-announcement trading value of acquirers’ directors is positively related to 
announcement-period abnormal returns. 
 Corporate governance plays a significant role in directors’ trading pattern prior to 
acquisition announcement. 
